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1"Global Environmental Problems Require Global Solutions":
A Case Study in Ecomessianism1
Tyler Veak and Wyatt Galusky2
Abstract
Many Western environmental activist groups and theorists have
sounded the call for the Earth's salvation from the "global
environmental crisis." What is lacking, however, is some reflection
on the ramifications of framing the problem globally, and on the
justifications for particular solutions. This paper examines the
"ecomessiah" (saviors of the Earth) phenomenon to investigate the
impacts of these types of programs. Specifically, we examine the
"global environmental ethic" proposed by J. Baird Callicott. His
program, presented as an inclusive system that incorporates non-
Western belief systems, trades heavily on Western science as an
authority and a justification. We contend that his ethic, while well-
intentioned, rests on assumptions and uses of science that subvert
both non-Western ideologies and non-Western interests rather than
revere them. Consequently, the inherent flaws undermine the feel-
good one-world rhetoric that he espouses.
Ecomessianism is the positioning assumed by certain Western environmentally-
oriented organizations or individuals, “that they have the knowledge and the human
and financial resources which entitle them to lead the environmental movement, and
hence all of society, on the only true road to Earth’s salvation” (Gudynas, 170). Various
environmental groups and ideologues (e.g. the World Watch Institute, EarthFirst!, Deep
Ecologists) have been empowered by the thought of potential global catastrophe to
1 Pre-print of an article published in the Bulletiin of Science, Technology & Society, Vol. 19, No. 6, December
1999, 532-538.
2 Tyler Veak is a Ph.D. candidate in Science and Technology Studies (STS) at Virginia Tech. His research
interests center around philosophy of Technology and radical environmental philosophy. Wyatt Galusky
is also a Ph.D. candidate in STS at Virginia Tech, with research interests that include the relationships
2present totalizing solutions and steer the world in the ‘right’ direction. While these
potential protectors of the Earth rush headlong into their global triage programs, little
effort is expended into evaluating the authenticity and desirability of such efforts. That
is, implicit in their very conceptualization of the problem are values and assumptions
that need to be exposed and critiqued. Whose earth, why them, what direction: these
questions need to be addressed when evaluating what these purported ‘saviors’
advocate versus what they may in fact be doing.
Ecomessianism relies on several factors which allows it to appear viable: the use
of science as a tool to identify and fix environmental problems; the identification of
those problems as primarily global; and the establishment of an ecocratic discourse
used to promote the legitimacy of these efforts. An ecocratic discourse involves a new
climate of environmental ‘consciousness’ that reinforces the ‘global’ environmental
concern. It “offers not only a diagnosis of current problems, but also offers measures on
how to deal with them” (Gudynas, 175). Within this discourse, which relies on the
might of Western science, developing countries and indigenous peoples are effectively
removed from the conversation. Despite its benign or even benevolent feel,
ecomessianism tends to invalidate knowledge claims of the non-scientist and the non-
westerner. Ecomessiahs have the ‘right’ way, bolstered by science. Thus, native
practices are opened up for evaluation, to see just how ‘ecological’ the groups are in
their lands, and what sort of technological advances could engender a more optimal
performance. It is the expert that verifies and sanctifies knowledge. Indigenous
between environmental activism, science, and popular cultural mediums. Both authors received a
Master's degree in Philosophy, specializing in Environmental Ethics, from the University of North Texas.
3peoples do not get their livelihoods back if their village practices are not deemed
‘ecological’. The epistemic evaluation is clear – Western science is charged with
certifying or devaluing. Thus, despite the helpful rhetoric, ecomessiahs can exhibit
much of the same domination that they had hoped to overcome through their efforts.
In this paper, we will examine one particular environmental ethicist, J. Baird
Callicott, who displays certain ecomessianistic tendencies. We will first examine
Callicott's own justification for the scope ("globalness") of his argument, which trades
heavily on recent developments in Western science and its apparent conviviality with
particular non-Western ideologies. Then, we will explore the more troubling
assumptions that his program is based upon, and the ramifications of those
assumptions. We hope to show that while Callicott has good intentions, he presents a
global environmental ethic that subverts much of the "wisdom" he purports to cherish
by unjustifiably privileging one particular form of knowledge and framing of the
problem over all others.
Callicott's "Global Environmental Ethic"
J. Baird Callicott, one the leading authors in the field of environmental ethics,
examined non-western attitudes toward nature in his book Earth Insights, and suggested
a conception of how these different attitudes might fit under the umbrella of a global
environmental ethic. Central to Callicott's effort is his appropriation of what he calls the
new "postmodern" sciences.
4According to Callicott, the postmodern scientific worldview, which is based on
the new sciences of relativity physics and ecology, is slowly replacing the mechanistic
paradigm. He claims that "One might therefore envision a single cross-cultural
environmental ethic based on ecology and the new physics and expressed in the
cognitive lingua franca of contemporary science" (12), and that the "Indigenous
worldviews around the globe can contribute a fund of symbols, images, metaphors,
similes, analogies, stories, and myths to advance the process of articulating the new
postmodern scientific worldview" (192). 3 In sum, Callicott argues that non-western
sources provide fresh ways of articulating the "new science," and thereby become "co-
creators" of a universal worldview based on western science and augmented by non-
western worldviews (Ibid).
After a survey of non-western belief systems on the environment, Callicott, in
Earth Insights, presents his notion of what the ethical "standard" for other belief systems
should be:
[The "land ethic"] is not just one option among many, standing alongside, say,
the Jain ahimsa environmental ethic, and appealing only to members of a specific
sect or culture. It is a sister environmental ethic, but it is also proffered as a
universal environmental ethic, with globally acceptable credentials, underwriting
3 Although Callicott uses the lingo of postmodern "storytelling", he is in fact far more committed to an
oral/epistemological/ontological monism than any postmodernist. To illustrate this commitment to
monism, see: J. Baird Callicott, "The Case Against Moral Pluralism," Environmental Ethics 12, 1990.
5and reinforcing each of the others. Further, it is also intended to serve as a standard
for evaluating others [emphasis added] (188).
Clearly, Callicott is not hiding the privileging of his conception of a "postmodern
evolutionary-ecological environmental ethic," as he explicitly states that his ethic is
intended as a "standard for evaluating others." The basis for this privileging of Western
science relies on his claim that since:
Science is now practiced internationally, with only the slightest culture-specific
variations from nation to nation...One can fairly assert that at least the ever-
evolving scientific worldview enjoys genuine international currency. The
postmodern evolutionary-ecological environmental ethic here outlined may
therefore make a claim to universality simply to the extent that its scientific
foundations are universally endorsed-whether openly and enthusiastically or
sub rosa (189).
Globalizing the Local: Privileging Western Science
Appealing to science as a justification for this type of global frame is not without
its problems, however. Aspects of scientific knowledge must be examined before
Western science can be used as a reliable (and universal) authority. As Bruno Latour
notes in his work on the nature of science, no scientific knowledge production can be
6ascribed a priori as natural (and thus universal). It is only after a controversy deciding
which knowledge claim and representation is more accurate does the ascription
‘natural’ get applied: “…the settlement of a controversy is the cause of Nature’s
representation” (Latour, 99). A controversy comes to a resolution once a competing
network expands by a larger extent than its rival.4 The expansion of this network
(which includes the enrollment of all actors, especially social), implies that it had been
largely more accommodating to the existing hierarchies. The controversies exist in the
first place because knowledge production begins from a very particular locality
(whether lab or location) that must be made convincing, in order to ensure that the
wider application is relevant (Latour, 247-51).
Further, ecofeminists and post-colonialists have persuasively argued that
"science" is simply one, among many, ways of "knowing." Women and indigenous
peoples frequently emphasize "participatory" (Shiva 1995, 51), "subjective-experiential,"
and "embodied" knowing over the objective-abstract-disembodied knowing of
contemporary science (Mellor, 118). The "new" science advocated by Callicott is no
exception.5 Far from being "universally endorsed", Western science should perhaps be
best described as useful given certain particular and culturally-specific values and
4 Bruno Latour conceives of scientific knowledge production as essentially the expansion of varying
"networks" (composed of scientists, policy makers, and even material objects), which are mobilized
around a certain concept or design strategy. Particular groups then compete by attempting to enroll
others into their respective networks and thus dwarf the competition.
5 While Callicott is clearly privileging Western science, he is not suggesting Western science as a standard
because it has any epistemological or ontological insight into truth with a capital "T," or reality with a
capital "R" (190). Rather, he argues that Western science is epistemologically privileged because "it is self-
consciously self-critical"; that is, "scientists...scrutinize one another's work" (190, 191). The Western
scientific worldview is, therefore, privileged because, unlike other worldviews it is self-reflective and
critical. These properties, however, are implicitly assumed to be universally valuable, but they are also
arguably cultural specific (i.e. local).
7experiences. One can admit to the pervasiveness of science without granting a "claim to
universality."
Growing Pains:
Expanding the Influence of Western Science
In this case, Callicott's specific "locality" (both in terms specific knowledge and
specific history, represented by his "post-modern scientific worldview") is generalized
and naturalized through the scope of its network, and used to determine scientifically-
based policy. Continuing with Latour, he argues that part of the delicacy involved in
maintaining a disciplinary whole and expanding its influence involves increasing the
amount of people the network's ‘facts’ touch and influence, and in turn limiting the
amount of negotiation that can be done with the information once it is delivered. Thus,
the dissemination of facts is not a sterile enterprise. The fact-builders need
“simultaneously to increase the amount of people taking part in the actions – so the
claim spreads – and to decrease the number of people taking part in the action – so the
claim spreads as it is” (Latour, 207). People need to be impacted by it, yet not impact it.
As a result, those spreading the network do two things simultaneously: establish their
importance (through the spread of the network) and reify their necessity (by being the
only fountain through which their network can flow). Callicott's rhetorical notions of
his network (his interpretation of the postmodern scientific worldview) being
"universally endorsed", "epistemologically privileged" and "a standard for evaluating"
8other worldviews illustrates the process just described (189;191;188). He at the same
time justifies the network by his assumption of universality (as is), and expands the
network by implying that others believe the same (just with slightly different concepts).
Callicott attempts to expand his own scientifically-augmented network by using
the implicit belief that ideas/beliefs/ethics can be appropriated from one context for
use in another context. While appropriation of ideas is not inherently misguided,
Callicott's suggested interchange of ideas takes place between his global ethic on the
one hand, which is based on his conception of a "postmodern scientific worldview", and
all the "rest" of the ethic(s) on the other. In other words, Callicott's suggested global
ethic, which is based on the local knowledge of Western science, would "uproot" and
globally impose6 itself on a plethora of indigenous-local-ethics. This game of ethical
"musical chairs" advocated by Callicott is deeply flawed.
Ideologies toward nature are rooted in specific local contexts, which have specific
modes of resource use (Merchant; Gadgil & Guha). In addition, these modes of
resource use are associated with specific social organizations. Hunter gatherers and
pastoralists tend to be more egalitarian (though possibly patriarchal) in their social
structure; industrial societies, on the other hand, are much more hierarchical in
structure (Gadgil & Guha). If an ideology, supported by a hierarchical power structure,
is exported to a context with a more egalitarian social organization, the ideology can
actually shift the social organization. Therefore, appropriating a belief system for use in
another context, as Callicott suggests, forces the ideology to conform, at least in some
6He states unequivocally that his global ethic serves as a "standard" for the rest (188).
9measure, to the prevailing social organization (e.g., Callicott's attempt to use non-
western beliefs to bolster his global environmental ethic, which is tied to multiple
power structures through his linking it with Western science).
Ramachandra Guha succinctly explicates the dangers inherent in transferring
ideas that are rooted in American conservation history (76). In cases where
"preservationist" philosophy has been exported to Third World countries, such as India,
tragic consequences have resulted as thousands of tribal peoples have been forced to
relocate.
Guha claims that Western biologists working under the financial backing of
powerful environmental groups pressured India's government to appropriate the
"common lands" of tribal peoples for the purpose of "preservation" (76). The resulting
social upheavals ultimately served to further strain the environment of India as more
people were forced to live on less land. Scarcity exacerbated the problems and
consequently groups began to fight each other for diminishing resources.
Guha's example demonstrates the problems inherent in attempting to export
belief systems (e.g. an environmental ethic) between contexts with differing social
structures. Preservationism emerged from American conservation philosophy in the
early part of this century. At the time, there was growing support for "setting aside"
wilderness areas primarily because the United States had the luxury (i.e., the land and
the affluence) to do so. The United States, by the turn of the century, had already moved
far down the road of industrialization. The bureaucratic machine necessary for Fordism
was no doubt a necessary component for fostering "preservationist" rhetoric. That is, the
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move away from an agrarian based economy to an industrial economy was a
prerequisite for implementing "preservationist" rhetoric.7
India's situation is much different. It has been populated far longer, and that
population is consequently much more dense. Further, the majority of its population
remains embedded in agrarian and pastoralist economies, which, as noted above, have
different social structures than industrial economies/societies. Hence, attempting to
export preservationist philosophy which is rooted in an industrial-hierarchical social
structure to India's more egalitarian agrarian/pastoralist social structure is, therefore,
problematic.
The connection with Callicott's project is obvious-he appears to be advocating
the imposition of a particular philosophy which is based on Western science.8 Callicott
ignores the fact that Western science, however nuanced, remains tied to the "old"
hierarchical power structures of the West that channel research and development
funding to the same old places.9 (Mellor, 55).
In addition, another problem arises in attempting to find resonance between
Western science with aspects of other belief systems. It is possible that the aspects that
are "resonating" between the non-western belief systems and Callicott's postmodern
scientific worldview are Enlightenment "leftovers." He makes the claim that these belief
systems "can contribute a fund of symbols, images, metaphors, similes, analogies,
7"Nature", in some sense, had to be put at "arms length" for it to be valued as it is valued by
"preservationism" (Nash, 1967). For a history of the roots of preservationism see Eugene C. Hargrove.
Foundations of Environmental Ethics. (Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice Hall, 1989); and Bryan G. Norton.
Toward Unity Among Environmentalists. (New York: Oxford University Press, 1991).
8Again, he explicitly states that his "ethic" is meant to be a "standard".
9Eighty percent of "development" projects (leaving aside the kind of "development") are awarded to First
World companies, or Third World elite (Escobar, 164-5).
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stories, and myths to advance the process of articulating the new postmodern scientific
worldview" (192). However, the aspects that are resonating-"myth, magic, and
ritual"-may be "functional equivalents of Enlightenment science and technology" (Luke
1997: 12). These aspects of non-Western belief systems (myth, etc.) can be used as a
means of manipulating and controlling nature; they may just not do so with the same
scope and "efficiency" as their Western counterparts (Ibid.). Nevertheless, the point is
that even if Callicott finds affinity between his constructed global ethic and these non-
Western societies, it does not mean they are ultimately more ecologically sensible. If the
desire for control and domination is transferred over into existing hierarchical power
structures, nothing is resolved.
Who Benefits?:
Subsuming Non-Western Values Under a Global Heading
Of course, one may find fault with Callicott's very attempt to appropriate these
ideologies into his own system. Anticipating this kind of objection, he looks to avoid
that criticism through complimentarity:
The 'act of appropriation' is on the face of it an indication of respect rather than
disrespect-imitation being the sincerest form of flattery...favorable comparison
with the emerging postmodern scientific worldview…validates traditional and
indigenous intellectual achievements. It gives them new meaning, dignity, and power
[emphasis added] (193).
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In his appropriation of certain idealized facets of these ideologies, Callicott
succumbs to romanticizing (at least on the surface) these other cultures. However,
romanticizing ignores the oppressive social structures both in the non-western context
from which the ideas are appropriated and in the meta-ethic that the ideas are used to
support (Mellor, 35; 55). Romanticizing can also hide the very real social and ecological
problems in these non-western cultures. That is, by emphasizing how environmentally
"friendly" these various non-western belief systems are, we can easily forget about the
environmentally destructive "practices" that many of these groups are forced into by the
present global market system (e.g., deforestation, urban sprawl, and rapid depletion of
natural resources due to increased competition) (Zimmerman, 156).
In addition, Callicott's assertion that non-western societies need "validating" so
that their dignity is increased has all the earmarks of imperialism. The West's
imperialistic imposition of technology and economy has degraded, if not outright
eliminated, many cultures. Creating (perpetuating?) a hierarchical-hegemonic ideology,
as Callicott's project advocates, extends the homogenizing monoculture of Western
development to the "mind" (i.e., ideology) (Mellor, 64-67).
This homogenization is furthered by the conceptualization of environmental
problems as primarily global. While not explicitly referring to any particular "global
catastrophe", Callicott does propose a global solution, which makes overtures toward
an Earth-wide calamity. By conceptualizing the problems that people face as the same
(both in substance and meaning) for everyone, he can claim that he is justified in
proposing large-scale changes and solutions to these world problems. But, just what is
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‘global’ and why is it such an important concept? Does it really serve everyone’s
interests, or does it promote the designs and desires of a select few? Must these
problems be conceived in this manner; and if not, what are the ramifications of them
being so conceived?
The Meaning of "Global"
The global-ness of the environmental crisis is not a self-evident condition. It has
a specific and relatively new history. As Escobar notes: “The category ‘global problems’
is of recent invention, deriving its main impetus from the ecological fervor fostered by
the Club of Rome reports of the 1970s, which provided a distinct vision of the world as
a global system where all the parts are interrelated” (193). In addition, Vandana Shiva
explains that the concept of global is narrow and misleading (1993, 151). What is global
is the one localized problem that has a global reach: namely, the industrialized west.
Western influence spans the Earth, yet it is a very localized and specific form of
knowledge and appeal. Referring to the infamous Bruntland Report, Escobar relates the
kind of hopeful rhetoric involved in that kind of projection. Invoking a collective “we”,
the report proclaims the need for a more sustainable planet. But who is the referent of
this knowledgeable “we”? Looking closely, “we” turns out to be “the familiar figure of
the Western scientist turned manager” (193). Despite all the one-world rhetoric, “[t]he
Western scientist continues to speak for the Earth” (194).
The Third World is subjugated under this global heading. Gudynas notes the
pedagogical outcome of such ‘global’ conceptions (173). The flow of information and
expertise is always from the First to the Third World, and not vice versa. The West
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offers help to the Third World for development strategies, resource and debt
management, etc., while the industrialized countries do not seek advice the other way.
On the surface, Callicott appears to rectify this one-way dialogue through drawing on
other belief systems. However, by filtering these belief systems through his system,
which is based on Western ideologies (i.e., science, and ecological philosophy), Callicott
at most pays lip service to these other belief systems. They are not appealed to provide
unavailable insight, but rather used as diminutive "seconds" to Western wisdom (which
thus validates that cultural system as somehow "useful"). Thus, despite his one-world
feel, he means for the solution to the "global environmental crisis" to be mitigated
through Western ideologies alone.
Conclusion(s)
As stated, Callicott's effort to construct a "multicultural" yet "unified"
environmental ethic is a worthy aim. However, the problems in basing this unification
on Western science are clear-however nuanced it may sound. Callicott's understanding
of science is extremely Eurocentric, to say the least; but the larger issue is his failure to
acknowledge the hierarchical power structures that come along with appealing to
"Western science." Similarly, in appropriating ideologies from one cultural context for
use in another, though not inherently deleterious, can be extremely disruptive to social
organizations if the two contexts are dissimilar in material conditions and social
structure. Finally, Callicott's view of non-western peoples, far from "venerating," is
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actually a "romanticization" with ulterior motives-that is, to further his project of a
"postmodern evolutionary ecological environmental ethic."
Rather than being informed by different forms of knowledge production and
cultural insights, Callicott judges the ‘rightness’ of these views based upon a Western
ideal-scientific knowledge. By co-opting indigenous views and pre-forming them into
his own level of reality, he denies the independent value of these particular forms of
reality. Instead, it is an example of a local product being appropriated, privatized,
commodified, and redistributed to the original owners. What results is devaluation or
outright denial of indigenous or other alternative knowledge production; instead of
wanting to eradicate the native peoples, the ecomessiahs want to ‘save’ them – to save
them ‘in what manner’ and ‘as what’ are questions best left to the "experts." This
bottom-up approach is just a guise for another form of top-down valuation. Callicott's
ecomessianistic tendency is clearly evident, in that the salvation flows only through his
Western based ethical theory.
Also, by implicitly endorsing the conceptualization of certain environmental
problems as primarily global and boundary-less (e.g. global warming), Callicott both
extends the reach of Western scientific "authority" and provides a platform for subtle
forms of ideological imperialism. A positive feedback loop is created, in which the
"global" aspect of the crisis "requires" a global authority (Western science and its
"universal currency"), which in turn is used to "certify" other systems as ecologically
benign or not. This certification qua homogenization then reinforces the "global-ness"
of the problem by helping to remake the world in one (Western) image. Callicott
16
justifies his own project in terms of this ideological Catch-22-the world (as defined and
filtered by my belief system) needs to be saved, and thus can only be done through
appeals to the ecomessiah (or at least the eco-evangelist).
Callicott is only one example of an increasing number of attempts to establish a
new attitude toward nature by appealing to non-western belief systems.10 This
endeavor, though not entirely misguided, should be approached with caution. The
consequences of recommendations such as Callicott's cannot be underestimated as we
note the ongoing social upheaval caused by the imperialist imposition of Western
preservationist philosophy in the Third World. Callicott is not unaware of the power of
such ideas, as he states: "ideas shape the stage on which the human drama is enacted"
(210). However, in shaping the "human drama," the issue of justice cannot be ignored.
10Deep ecology, and various forms of ecofeminism have also attempted to link themselves philosophically
to primal/indigenous people groups (Mellor; Zimmerman).
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